Schizophrenia and the Scaffolded Self by Krueger, Joel
Vol.:(0123456789) 
Topoi 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-018-9547-3
Schizophrenia and the Scaffolded Self
Joel Krueger1 
 
© The Author(s) 2018. This article is an open access publication
Abstract
A family of recent externalist approaches in philosophy of mind argues that our psychological capacities are synchronically 
and diachronically “scaffolded” by external (i.e., beyond-the-brain) resources. I consider how these “scaffolded” approaches 
might inform debates in phenomenological psychopathology. I first introduce the idea of “affective scaffolding” and make 
some taxonomic distinctions. Next, I use schizophrenia as a case study to argue—along with others in phenomenological 
psychopathology—that schizophrenia is fundamentally a self-disturbance. However, I offer a subtle reconfiguration of these 
approaches. I argue that schizophrenia is not simply a disruption of ipseity or minimal self-consciousness but rather a disrup-
tion of the scaffolded self, established and regulated via its ongoing engagement with the world and others. I conclude by 
considering how this scaffolded framework indicates the need to consider new forms of intervention and treatment.
Keywords Externalism · Embodiment · Scaffolded cognition · Emotions · Phenomenological psychopathology · 
Schizophrenia · Self-disorder
1 Introduction
A family of recent externalist approaches in philosophy 
of mind argues that minds are more than brains. For these 
approaches, our psychological capacities are realized not just 
by our brains but also by our bodies, as well as the complex 
ways these bodies interact with their material and social 
environments. Some working in this area have recently 
developed externalist approaches to affect. They argue that 
moods and emotions, for example, can be synchronically 
and diachronically “scaffolded” by external (i.e., beyond-
the-brain) resources that actively regulate the qualitative 
and temporal character of the state in question. From this 
perspective, the physical basis of these states may not be 
restricted to the individual but instead encompass external 
resources—e.g., artefacts, technologies, and other people—
with which she is closely connected.
Despite much recent interest in this topic, it has not yet 
found its way to philosophy of psychiatry in a substantive 
way.1 This is surprising. Since disturbances of affectivity 
figure so prominently in a wide variety of mental disor-
ders, the topic seems like a fruitful place to bridge exter-
nalist paradigms and psychiatry. In what follows, I attempt 
to build such a bridge. I have two main objectives: first, I 
introduce the idea of “affective scaffolding”. I distinguish 
three forms of affective scaffolding and support this tax-
onomy by appealing to different sources of empirical work. 
Second, I put the idea of affective scaffolding to work in 
the context of psychopathology. Using schizophrenia as a 
case study, I argue—along with others in phenomenologi-
cal psychopathology—that schizophrenia is fundamentally 
a self-disturbance. However, I offer a subtle reconfiguration 
of these approaches. I argue that schizophrenia is not simply 
a disruption of ipseity or minimal self-consciousness but 
rather a disruption of the scaffolded self, established and reg-
ulated via its ongoing engagement with the world and others. 
I conclude that this way of thinking about the scaffolded self 
is potentially transformative both for our theoretical as well 
as practical understanding of the causes and character of 
schizophrenic experience, insofar as it suggests the need to 
consider new forms of intervention and treatment.
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1 Cooper (2017), Drayson (2009), Hoffman (2016), and Sprevak 
(2011) all provide helpful discussions of how externalist approaches 
to cognition might inform thinking about mental disorders. However, 
only Hoffman mentions emotions—and while suggestive, this part of 
her discussion is quite brief.
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2  Externalising Affect
Externalist approaches to cognition argue that cognitive 
processes like believing and remembering depend upon 
resources beyond the head. The various tools and technolo-
gies we use to support these processes play such a crucial 
role in “scaffolding” (i.e., setting up, driving, and regulat-
ing) them, we ought to view these external resources as part 
of the cognitive process itself (Clark 2008) —or at least as 
contributing environmental support essential for maintaining 
the character and functional integrity of the process in ques-
tion (Sterelny 2010).2 A prominent trend in recent externalist 
debates considers the possibility that affective states like 
moods and emotions might be similarly scaffolded (Carter 
et al. 2016; Colombetti and Roberts 2015; Greenwood 2013; 
Krueger 2014b; Krueger and Szanto 2016; Slaby 2014; Ste-
phan et al. 2014). Call this the scaffolded affectivity the-
sis (SA). One way to motivate SA is by investigating the 
different strategies we use to regulate affect. Traditionally, 
affect regulation has been seen as a process that occurs 
almost entirely inside people’s heads (e.g., Gross 2015). 
But this internalist supposition ignores emergent qualities 
of affect regulation that only arise via an individual’s ongo-
ing engagement with features of their extra-neural body, as 
well as their material and social environment (Koole and 
Veenstra 2015).
Everyday life reveals many cases where we “offload” 
part the regulatory process onto the world; it loops through 
different parts of our environment before coming back to 
us, shaping our experience and behavior. Importantly, these 
processes constitutively depend on the input of external 
resources for their format and dynamics. For example, we 
play or listen to music, drink wine, light candles, wear spe-
cific items of clothing, or seek familiar spaces and friends to 
evoke and regulate specific affective experiences that reflect 
idiosyncratic details of the resource(s) involved (Colombetti 
and Krueger 2015; Maiese 2016). Listening to a favorite 
song, for example, will regulate our affective state in a way 
qualitatively different than will dressing up in a favorite 
shirt, decluttering our office to alleviate stress, or commis-
erating with a close friend.
Not every environmental interaction supports SA. It’s 
unclear that simply coming home and lighting candles to 
relax after a stressful day scaffolds my affective state in the 
relevant sense. The causal relation here seems unidirec-
tional: from world (i.e., candles) to me. The soothing light 
of the candles may help shape my mood. But my affective 
response doesn’t affect a material change in the candles—a 
bidirectional interplay SA proponents argue is necessary for 
genuine integration with external resources to occur (Sutton 
2010). Still, there are many other cases that do involve tight 
bidirectional engagements, operating both synchronically 
and diachronically, whereby external resources take over 
and scaffold regulative dynamics in an ongoing way and, in 
so doing, open up new forms of experience and expression.
3  Forms of Affective Scaffolding
Before turning to psychopathology, I first distinguish three 
forms of “affective scaffolding”: beyond-the-head resources 
that drive and regulate our affective states. Three forms of 
scaffolding relevant here are embodied, social, and material 
scaffolding.
3.1  Embodied Scaffolding
No one doubts, of course, that brains are necessary for 
the occurrence of affective states. But multiple strands of 
empirical work suggest that brains alone are not sufficient 
for affective states. The latter are scaffolded not just by 
neural processes but also by their integration with physical 
resources spatially distributed throughout the extra-neural 
body.
Colombetti (2017) has recently argued that an explana-
tion of the physical basis of mood disorders, which involve 
changes in neurotransmitters and neuromodulators, must 
involve more than just brain activity. Neurotransmitters and 
neuromodulators are not sealed off from the body but instead 
interact with other parts of the organism. And these interac-
tions involve an array of extra-neural processes operating 
at multiple time-scales: e.g., fluctuating rates of blood glu-
cose in the bloodstream; hormonal processes (released by 
endocrine glands in the brain and body); complex chemical 
activities synthesized locally in different areas of the body 
during stress responses; mood- and behavior-influencing gut 
microbiota, etc. The takeaway point is that the essential role 
these processes play in generating moods strongly suggests 
the latter’s physical basis consists of integrated processes 
looping through the brain and extra-neural body.
2 Although I am sympathetic to extended approaches to cognition 
generally, I will here follow Sterelny and use “scaffolding” to refer to 
the many ways resources beyond brain and body act as “fuels for cog-
nition” (Sterelny 2010, p. 473). For Sterelny, discussions of extended 
cognition (e.g., Clark 2008) focus excessively on single agents inter-
acting with informational resources (notebooks, smartphones, etc.) 
to enhance their cognitive capacities—an individualistic focus that 
“obscures rather than highlights” the many ways we engineer our 
environments to augment intelligent action on both an individual and 
collective level (Sterelny 2010, p.  473). A scaffolded perspective is 
a more general—and thus for Sterelny, more powerful—framework 
than a (merely) extended approach. Crucially, it affirms the impor-
tance of including resources beyond brain and body when explaining 
the causes and character of cognition. But it does so without becom-
ing mired in unhelpful “causal-constitution” debates (e.g., Adams 
and Aizawa 2008). For more on this latter point, see Colombetti and 
Krueger (2015, pp. 1157–1160).
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Other work extends affectivity beyond our neurophysiol-
ogy to the outer limits of our embodiment. There is evi-
dence that some emotions may be scaffolded by behavioral 
expressions like facial expressions, gestures, and patterns of 
interpersonal entrainment. One line of evidence comes from 
deficit studies: cases where an emotion’s bodily expression 
is compromised or missing, such as a form of congenital 
bilateral facial paralysis called Moebius Syndrome (Cole 
and Spalding 2009). Some people with Moebius Syndrome 
report phenomenologically diminished emotional lives (e.g., 
“I sort of think happy of think sad, not really saying or rec-
ognizing actually feeling happy or feeling sad”) and struggle 
regulating their emotions (Krueger and Henriksen 2016). A 
similar effect is observed in individuals who receive Botox 
injections inhibiting facial expressions (Baumeister et al. 
2016), or in cases of acquired facial paralysis such as Bell’s 
Palsy (Cole 1998). Other work suggests that individuals who 
suffer severe spinal cord injuries report less-intense feelings 
of emotions like fear, anger, or sexual arousal (Chwalisz 
et al. 1988).
For our purposes, there are two important takeaway 
points. First, multiple lines of evidence suggest that some 
affective experiences are scaffolded by a range of physi-
cal processes distributed throughout and to the edges of 
our body. Second, some regulative processes likewise loop 
through this affective scaffolding and modulate the character 
of our experience.
This latter point can be sharpened by observing that how 
an affective experience feels is often a function of how it’s 
regulated. And the latter is a process invoking features of our 
extra-neural body such as agency, expression, and attention. 
Individuals can up-regulate anger or pain experience simply 
by frowning, for example (Marzoli et al. 2013); conversely, 
they can dampen the experience and shorten its temporal 
duration by inhibiting its physical or vocal expression (Duc-
los and Laird 2001). Manipulating emotion-specific expres-
sions like smiling or frowning even modulates how we pro-
cess the same stimulus, such as the perceived funniness of 
a cartoon or the friendliness of another person (Ohira and 
Kurono 1993).
As we negotiate different spaces in everyday life (work, 
home, school, etc.), we adopt a range of flexible, context-
sensitive bodily strategies for regulating affect. We adopt 
a more reserved and less expressive countenance at work 
or a formal setting than we do at home or when out with 
friends. But these bodily strategies and the manner by which 
we enact them nevertheless remain unique to us; they are 
part of our affective style: our habitual way of moving, act-
ing, expressing, and regulating affect (Colombetti 2016). 
For most of us, this affective style is largely enacted spon-
taneously, without deliberate thought. Our body and its 
expressive resources are experientially present as scaffold-
ing immediately available to us in crafting our distinctive 
affective style on a moment-to-moment basis. As we’ll see 
shortly, this is not the case with some schizophrenic patients. 
Many of them are experientially alienated from their bodies 
and thus lack reliable access to this embodied scaffolding, 
along with the regulative strategies it supports.
3.2  Social Scaffolding
A second way to motivate SA is by considering social scaf-
folding present both in our dyadic engagements as well 
in more complex processes operating at group and socio-
cultural levels. An exhaustive analysis is beyond present 
concerns (see Parkinson et al. 2005). A few examples will 
suffice.
Consider first social scaffolding in early infancy. Because 
they lack endogenous mechanisms for attentional control 
and affect regulation, young infants depend upon ongoing 
input from caregivers to realize these capacities. This input 
is primarily provided by social scaffolding comprised of 
direct bodily contact and vocal exchanges. For example, 
much research has shown that by using different strategies 
to regulate infant attention—smiling, vocal modifications, 
singing, caressing, diverting or guiding attention away from 
objects of distress—infants and caretakers tightly integrate 
their expressive displays and realize affective convergence 
(Krueger 2013b). This is an early instance of a co-regulatory 
process distributed across social scaffolding encompassing 
both infant and caretaker (Taipale 2016).
Social scaffolding remains present throughout our life. 
When we interact with others, their expressive actions—
gestures, facial expressions, postural adjustments, intona-
tion patterns, movements and manipulations of shared space, 
etc.—directly impact our bodily responses. These mutually-
modulatory expressions comprise the dynamics of “we-
space”, or the shared space of our face-to-face engagements 
(Krueger 2011). A smile and friendly gesture, for instance, 
elicits similar responses from me and motivates an array of 
further friendly responses; a threatening gesture or aggres-
sive movement, conversely, compels me to tense up and pre-
pare for my own aggressive response. My embodied scaf-
folding is in this way dynamically integrated or “coupled” 
with that of others (De Jaegher and Di Paolo 2007). The 
kinetics, intensity, and timing of their affective expressions 
shape my ongoing responses, which in turn feeds back onto 
and shape their responses, which return to me and impact 
my ongoing responses, etc.
This socially distributed feedback loop regulates the 
affective dynamics of group engagements, too. When I am 
drawn into the exuberance of a lively party, say, or swept 
along by the collective rage of a political protest or the 
euphoria of a live concert with thousands of people, the 
expressions of others literally take hold of my body and pull 
responsive movements and affective responses out of me 
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that diachronically integrate with those of the crowd (Char-
trand and Bargh 1999; Slaby 2014). This process “creates 
a circular interplay of expressions and reactions running in 
split seconds and constantly modifying each partner’s bodily 
state, in a process that becomes highly autonomous and is 
not directly controlled by the partners” (Froese and Fuchs 
2012, p. 213). In other words, I am absorbed by a socially 
distributed co-regulatory system partially comprised of scaf-
folding beyond my head.
Many bodily processes that make up this scaffolding, such 
as motor mimicry and movement synchrony, are involuntary. 
The former refers to spontaneous mimicry of others’ facial 
expressions, gestures, movements, and intonation patterns; 
the latter, synchronizing speech rhythms and bodily move-
ments over short and long-term timescales (Bernieri and 
Rosenthal 1991; Wiltermuth and Heath 2009). A core affec-
tive function of this scaffolding is the promotion of social 
cohesion. When present, it enhances feelings of connected-
ness, rapport, and cooperation (Lakin and Chartrand 2003; 
van Baaren et al. 2004).
Although this scaffolding is largely constructed on an 
involuntary ad hoc basis, individuals do have some control 
over the way they access and exploit it. Knowing how and 
when to do this is a feature of effective self-maintenance and 
social functioning—another dimension of an individual’s 
affective style. For example, there is evidence that recovery 
from negative emotional episodes is augmented by selec-
tively attuning to smiling faces (Koole and Jostmann 2004), 
particularly in individuals who exhibit strong emotional 
resilience and self-esteem (DeWall et al. 2011). Presumably, 
this attunement triggers mimetic responses that up-regulate 
the individual’s negative affective state. It thus seems that 
strategic attunement to and use of social scaffolding in we-
space is crucial for successful affect regulation and a way to 
cope with an ever-changing social world.
3.3  Material Scaffolding
A third way to motivate SA is by looking at the integra-
tion of affectivity with material culture: things, spaces, 
and places comprising our everyday environments. Some 
argue that making music is an instance affective scaffolding 
(Cochrane 2008; Geeves and Sutton 2015; Roberts 2015). 
When musicians practice with their instrument, this engage-
ment is an ongoing process of affective self-stimulation: 
physical qualities of the instrument and auditory properties 
of the produced sound coax affective responses out of the 
performer and synchronically regulate the character of their 
experience. When actively integrated with their instrument 
this way, musicians realize affective states with a particular 
intensity, complexity, and temporal character only possible 
when part of this materially-scaffolded musical feedback 
loop.
A similar integration-cum-regulation can occur in music 
listening, too (Krueger 2014a). Listeners routinely use 
technologies like MP3 players, smartphones, and music 
streaming services to scaffold affect (Skånland 2013). These 
technologies are both portable and highly personalized: we 
manipulate self-selected playlists specifically to elicit dif-
ferent emotional motor responses. And these manipula-
tions loop back onto us, shaping our future manipulations 
and responsive behavior. Auditory properties of the music 
directly modulate a cascade of affect-driving neural and 
physiological responses, coaxing experiences out of us and 
regulating their embodied dynamics in real-time over short 
and long-term listening episodes (Elvers 2016; Witek et al. 
2014). When integrated with musical technologies this way, 
musical-affective feedback loops scaffold access to expe-
riences and regulatory capacities that might otherwise be 
inaccessible—even from the earliest stages of life (Krueger 
2013a).
There are many other cases where regulatory processes 
loop through our ongoing interactions with material cul-
ture. For example, wearing appropriate hiking shoes while 
walking down a steep path covered in loose gravel—in con-
trast to walking the same path in light tennis shoes with a 
flat sole—directly scaffolds our affective state (Colombetti 
2016). We’re not directly aware of the shoes themselves in 
this context, as explicit objects of experience. We focus 
instead on the path and our interactions with it. But our 
shoes are nevertheless experientially present as scaffolding 
through which we experience the path; they are transpar-
ently integrated into the suite of sensorimotor skills we use 
to negotiate this environment. And the ongoing feedback 
we receive from our shoes regulates how we feel and how 
the world shows up for us via this feeling (i.e., as affording 
confident walking vs. a halting or nervous descent).3
We can appeal to still other cases, too: from our interac-
tions with items of clothing and accessories like handbags 
(Kaufmann 2011) or religious artifacts (Krueger 2016), to 
the “affective atmospheres” of corporate spaces and the 
people and things that make up these spaces (Slaby 2016). 
Defenders of SA argue that these instances of materially-
scaffolded affect regulation highlight the decentered nature 
of many affective experiences—that is, the extent to which 
the individual’s endogenous resources, when working 
together with some external resource or set of resources, no 
longer constitutes the sole locus of regulative control.
The important point is that enjoying reliable access to 
the things and spaces of our material culture—being able to 
actively integrate with them in an immediate and spontane-
ous way—is crucial for our ability to stabilize and regulate 
our affective life. And taken together, then, this survey of 
3 Maiese (2015) refers to this phenomenon as “affective framing”.
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embodied, social, and material scaffolding supports the idea 
that many affective and self-regulative process are driven 
and organized, at multiple timescales, by external resources 
beyond brain and body. Individuals who lack consistent and 
reliable access to this affective scaffolding—whether embod-
ied, social, or material—lack access to the functional and 
experiential benefits these external resources provide. The 
experience of “unworlding” in schizophrenia offers a pow-
erful case study of what happens when individuals become 
detached from these different forms of affective scaffold-
ing—an experiential disturbance of the scaffolded self.
4  Schizophrenia as a Self‑Disorder
A common way to characterize schizophrenia is to see posi-
tive and negative symptoms as separate entities. The former 
includes clinical manifestations of hallucinations, delusions, 
and the like; the latter, a diminishment or loss of normal 
function (alogia, anhedonia, apathy, etc.). However, phe-
nomenological approaches to psychopathology downplay 
or even reject this distinction and instead approach patients’ 
experience as an integrated whole (Ratcliffe 2008). They 
treat schizophrenia as a qualitative transformation of the 
entire structure of experience, rooted in a disturbance of the 
minimal or core sense of self (Sass and Parnas 2003; see also 
Parnas and Henriksen 2016).
According to the so-called “ipseity-disturbance model” 
(IDM),4 this core self is a pre-reflective form of self-aware-
ness: the enduring feeling of being a subject for whom 
conscious states are given in a first-personal mode of pres-
entation. It is said to be a necessary structural feature of 
experience, inextricable from “the distinct manner, or how, 
of experiencing” (Zahavi 2014, p. 22). A disturbance of 
this core self typically manifests in patient reports suggest-
ing that this first-person immediacy of their experience is 
somehow attenuated: “My I-feeling is diminished”; “My I 
is disappearing for me” (Parnas and Handest 2003, p. 125). 
“I am disconnected, disintegrated, diminished...I feel that 
my real self has left me...” (Kean 2009, p. 1034). Within the 
framework of IDM, this disturbance is termed diminished 
self-affection.
Diminished self-affection is often accompanied by a 
compensatory hyperreflective form of self-monitoring 
(Fuchs 2010b). Within this stance, habitual aspects of the 
self normally in the background of awareness—including 
one’s affective style, or the distinctive way one thinks, lis-
tens, speaks, expresses emotions, and interacts with oth-
ers and the material environment—are thrust to the fore-
ground and become objects of intense scrutiny. As a result, 
the spontaneity and naturalness of everyday interactions is 
lost, and individuals struggle to smoothly connect with the 
world and others. For example, patients report that thinking 
becomes difficult because their thoughts take on spatial or 
object-like qualities (Parnas and Handest 2003). Moreover, 
normally spontaneous actions like gesturing, falling asleep, 
putting a book on the shelf, or making small talk become 
impossible to carry out due to their excessive focus on every 
aspect of their performance (Fuchs 2010a). For IDM, this 
interplay between diminished self-affection and hyperreflex-
ivity is fundamental to the dynamics of the self-disorder 
distinctive of schizophrenic experience.
IDM offers rich descriptions that greatly enhance our 
understanding of what it’s like to live with schizophrenia 
from the first-person perspective. However, by focusing so 
heavily on anomalies of perception and cognition, there 
is a risk of downplaying or overlooking the affective and 
emotional distress at the heart of schizophrenia.5 SA can 
help with this concern. Additionally, by presupposing such 
a thin conception of the self—again, ipseity conceived of as 
a minimal form of self-consciousness at the heart of indi-
vidual conscious states—there is a related risk of overlook-
ing the richly situated character of self-disturbances within 
SZ, that is, the extent to which aspects of these disturbances 
are distributed across and modulated by the dynamics of 
the individual’s embodied relationship with others and their 
material environment. Once more, SA can help deal with 
this worry and illuminate various dimensions of the dis-
turbed scaffolded self.6
5  “Unworlding” as a Disturbance 
of the Scaffolded Self
Drawing on Heidegger, Sass (1990) characterizes schizo-
phrenia as a kind of “unworlding”. This idea is meant to 
capture the way that people with schizophrenia can become 
4 Ipseity is Latin for “self” or “itself”.
5 Hamm et al. (2015) develop a similar concern.
6 Fuchs (2015) and Ratcliffe (2017) both develop compelling char-
acterizations of schizophrenia that anticipate some things I say here. 
However, my discussion of SA differs in several respects. First, both 
focus primarily on disturbances at the interpersonal level. This focus 
is consistent with my characterization of “social scaffolding”. But 
neither says much about how the individual’s disturbed relation with 
the material environment shapes the character of their affective dis-
order and regulative dysfunction. Second, both focus on disturbances 
of intentionality: for Ratcliffe, a breakdown of the modal or anticipa-
tory structure of intentionality, which leads to changes in the structure 
of interpersonal experience; for Fuchs, a breakdown of motor inten-
tional processes that support our intersubjective capacities. While this 
focus is again consistent with SA, the latter, as we will see, illumi-
nates additional regulative mechanisms (i.e., forms of “scaffolding”) 
that don’t necessarily fall within the purview of intentionality-based 
accounts.
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experientially unmoored from the lived spaces of their eve-
ryday environments. Within this unworlding experience, 
people and things are no longer encountered as “ready-
to-hand”—as affording a range of immediately perceived 
interactive possibilities (the way a friendly smile affords 
conversation or a chair sitting) specified by the norms and 
conventions tacitly governing the context in which they’re 
encountered. Instead, everyday encounters and projects are 
experienced as puzzling or devoid of meaning. The world as 
a whole in this way loses its pragmatic and emotive quali-
ties, and the schizophrenic individual is unworlded to the 
extent that they lose reliable access to the people and things 
around them.
For IDM, unworlding can be traced back to a more fun-
damental ipseity disturbance that disrupts how individuals 
experientially relate to themselves and the world generally. 
But in this search for a single trouble générateur—and by 
ultimately locating this feature inside the head of the individ-
ual—the embodied and situated nature of unworlding, along 
with its affective character, is at risk of being downplayed 
or overlooked, and the causal complexity of the disorder 
over-simplified.7
I suggest instead that unworlding can be seen not simply 
as a disturbance of ipseity but of the scaffolded self. More 
specifically, the distinctive affective character of unworlding 
partially stems, I propose, from an inability to reliably access 
and exploit the regulative resources offered by different 
forms of beyond-the-head affective scaffolding (i.e., embod-
ied, social, and material). Without reliable access to this 
scaffolding, individuals lose not only their feeling of self-
intimacy but also their more pervasive feeling of being per-
sistently embedded in the world. Crucially, with this distur-
bance of affective scaffolding, they also lose reliable access 
to the functional and experiential benefits this scaffolding 
affords, which helps explain particular phenomenological 
features of their affective disturbance. If this characteriza-
tion of unworlding is on the right track, it thus challenges 
the assumption that the affectively-salient mechanisms of 
unworlding—and perhaps many affective disorders in psy-
chopathology more generally—can be explained by appeal-
ing exclusively to internal features of the individual, whether 
ipseity disturbances or disordered neural mechanisms.
5.1  Disturbances of Embodied and Social 
Scaffolding
Consider first the way unworlding involves disturbances of 
both embodied and social scaffolding. These two distur-
bances should be seen as interrelated, I suggest, because 
bodies are always bound up in interactive relationships with 
other bodies defined by patterns of mutual modulation and 
expressive reciprocity. Disruptions of embodied scaffolding 
are thus coextensive with disruptions of social scaffolding.
One of the most well-replicated findings in the literature 
is that people with schizophrenia exhibit less facial and vocal 
emotional expressiveness than do people without schizo-
phrenia (Kring and Elis 2013). One reason for this deficit 
is likely due not just to a neurophysiological abnormality 
(cf. Trémeau 2006) but additionally to the experiential dis-
tance many people with schizophrenia feel from their body 
as a lived through subject of experience and action (Krue-
ger and Henriksen 2016). Persistent experiences of bodily 
alienation, or loss of embodied self-intimacy, are common 
in schizophrenia spectrum disorders, although the character 
and articulation of this experience may vary: “it’s like I’m 
not in my body or not attached to it. It’s like my body is an 
appendix that hangs below me” (Henriksen and Nordgaard 
2016, p. 268). Often, the body is experienced as taking on 
a hyper-objectified or quasi-mechanical character: “I’m 
blessed with a bladder-emptier that I can turn on and off, and 
an anal expeller” (Angyal 1936); “I walk like a machine...
When I am walking, I look at my legs which are moving 
forward; I fear to fall by not moving them correctly” (Parnas 
2003, p. 227).
As these reports suggest—and as IDM emphasizes—
unworlding experiences clearly involve a disturbance of 
the self. However, what’s sometimes overlooked in these 
IDM discussions is that the particular bodily character of 
this self-disturbance means that patients with schizophre-
nia lose the ability to spontaneously access the affectively 
salient self-regulative resources offered by their embodied 
scaffolding. Because they no longer experientially inhabit 
their body with the immediate self-intimacy most of us take 
for granted, the suite of expressive resources normally avail-
able—again, bodily and agential components of an individ-
ual’s affective style like their distinctive gestural patterns, 
postures, facial expressions, and vocalizations—are inac-
cessible. And in light of the empirical evidence surveyed 
above, diminished access to regulative resources in bodily 
scaffolding would seemingly lead to diminished affective 
experience more generally.
This seems to be the case with some patients. For exam-
ple, we find reports like: “I feel the emotions but in a very 
attenuated way. Sometimes I have the feeling that I have to 
amplify a certain emotion. I try to hold on to it, grab it before 
it gets away” (Vodušek et al. 2014, p. 256); “It’s like an 
7 To be fair, in recent work, Sass (2007, 2014) has revised his earlier 
characterization of schizophrenia as lacking affect and now acknowl-
edges that ipseity disturbances involve an affective dimension. How-
ever, for Sass, ipseity disturbances nevertheless remain the generative 
disorder from which affective disturbances subsequently arise. SA 
instead sees self- and affective disorders as interrelated and co-aris-
ing. SA also offers additional descriptive resources for capturing the 
complexity and multidimensional character of these affective distur-
bances, including features (e.g., their regulative dynamics) that don’t 
neatly into IDM frameworks.
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internal block, a block of feelings” (Stanghellini et al. 2014, 
p. 278). And there is also evidence that people with schizo-
phrenia have more general difficulty adaptively regulating 
their emotions, too (Horan et al. 2013). Bleuler (1950), for 
example, describes patients jumping from one emotion to 
the next, from intense agitation to an exaggeratedly happy 
mood, only to become tearful and sad a few minutes later.
But a closer look reveals a puzzle. As already noted, 
much evidence suggests that people with schizophrenia 
are less expressive than people without schizophrenia. Yet, 
while some predictably report diminished affective experi-
ence, others do not—and some even report more intense 
affective experiences (along with difficulty regulating these 
experiences) than those without schizophrenia, despite their 
diminished bodily expressivity (Kring and Moran 2008). 
How should we account for this variability?
An internalist strategy is to explain these regulative dif-
ficulties in terms of top-down mechanisms, e.g., a distur-
bance of cognitive control and associated prefrontal corti-
cal circuitry (Horan et al. 2013). But this is an excessively 
narrow perspective that, once more, overlooks the extent 
to which regulative processes are comprised of embodied 
scaffolding dynamically intertwined with other expressive 
bodies—what I’ve termed social scaffolding. In light of their 
diminished bodily expressiveness, people with schizophrenia 
are not robustly integrated into shared social spaces of face-
to-face interactions—we-space—and thus lack consistent, 
robust access to the functional and experiential benefits that 
come from integrating with this scaffolding (Henriksen and 
Nilsson 2017). The unpredictability and disorganization of 
their affective life reflects this lack of consistent integration.
In support of this claim, there is evidence that schizo-
phrenic patients lack bodily empathy, or the ability to detect 
and respond to others’ facial and gestural expressions 
(Amminger et al. 2012; Edwards et al. 2002). This is con-
sistent with a more general deficit people with schizophrenia 
show in terms of processing faces and whole-body emo-
tional expressions (Chan et al. 2010; Van den Stock et al. 
2011). These disturbances reflect well-documented dif-
ficulties with “perceptual organization” in schizophrenia, 
including a fragmentation of space and object perception 
(Silverstein et al. 2017; Uhlhaas and Mishara 2007). These 
disruption manifests via various phenomenological anoma-
lies: e.g., figure-ground confusion, “visual echoes”, loss of 
perceptual stability, etc.
In the social realm—and to return to the idea of social 
scaffolding—this disruption means that individuals fail 
to perceive and respond to social affordances in others: 
ongoing interactive possibilities presented via their bod-
ily expressions, movements, and vocalizations (i.e., social 
scaffolding). In other words, others are often not seen as 
expressive unities animated by thoughts, intentions, and 
emotions, and as inviting an array of interactive responses. 
Instead, they are encountered as fragmented constellations 
of unrelated bits. For example, Sass (1992) quotes Renee, 
who reports that she “saw the individual features of [a 
woman’s] face, separated from each other: the teeth, then 
the nose, then the cheeks, then one eye and the other” 
(p. 50). Another says that “[p]eople turn weirdly about, 
they make gestures, movements without sense; they are 
phantoms whirling on an infinite plain, crushed by pitiless 
electric light” (Sechehaye 1970, p. 44).
This lack of access and responsiveness to others’ bodily 
expressions contributes to the individual’s loss of social 
attunement and feeling of alienation. As Stanghellini 
observes, the “capacity to get involved in and directly 
perceive others’ mental life is the basic requisite for the 
familiar feeling with the environment, at home, and in 
everyday social situations” (Stanghellini 2001, p. 207). 
An important aspect of this loss of social attunement is 
bodily empathy (or lack thereof)—mimicry and synchro-
nization of others’ gestures, expressions, and intentional 
actions. Without the ability to enact bodily empathy, how-
ever—which normally leads to regulative integration with 
others—people with schizophrenia instead experience a 
regulative desynchronization in relation to other people: 
multi-level disturbances of the “timing” of face-to-face 
interactions (aspects like gestural synchronization and 
rhythm) that feed into and reinforce their sense of social 
disconnectedness and animate their affective disorganiza-
tion (Van Duppen 2017). As a result, they lack immediate 
access to the regulative resources normally available in 
beyond-the-head social scaffolding (recall the earlier dis-
cussion of how recovery from negative affect is scaffolded 
by selectively attuning to and mimicking smiling faces). 
Without reliable perceptual access to this dyadic scaffold-
ing and its functional benefits, it’s not surprising, then, that 
people with schizophrenia experience unpredictable and 
disorganized affect. The ability to skillfully inhabit we-
space and establish dyadic episodes of socially distributed 
emotion regulation is a core aspects of our ability to man-
age the changing dynamics of our day-to-day affective life 
(Varga and Krueger 2013).
In addition to functional disturbances of face-to-face 
bodily dynamics, schizophrenic patients also show a 
general lack of social understanding writ large. In other 
words, they lack an implicit understanding of the “rules of 
the game” governing social encounters, a sense of propor-
tion for what is appropriate or relevant in social contexts 
such as what to say, how to act, how to express and manage 
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emotions, etc. They say things like, “I don’t really grasp 
what others are up to...I constantly observe myself while I 
am together with people, trying to find out what I should 
say or do. It’s easier when I am alone or watching TV” 
(Fuchs 2015, p. 200).8 The schizophrenic individual thus 
feels alienated not simply from dyadic encounters but also 
from everyday social environments because the bodily, 
social, and material resources that would normally provide 
regulative scaffolding (e.g., other people, social norms 
and conventions, material culture, etc.) are experientially 
unavailable. Without access to these external resources, 
patients thus experience an intersubjective unworlding that 
further animates their autistic withdrawal and contributes 
to the regulative difficulties they experience with respect 
to their affective style. In the next section, I consider how 
an experiential alienation from the things and spaces of 
material culture specifically factor into these affective 
disturbances.
5.2  Disturbances of Material Scaffolding
Disturbances of self-experience and intersubjectivity are 
relatively well-documented in the literature on schizophre-
nia, including IDM approaches (Henriksen and Nilsson 
2017; Pienkos 2015). The notion of the scaffolded self, I’ve 
suggested, can usefully supplement these existing discus-
sions by emphasizing both the richly embodied and inter-
personally situated nature of the disorder, that is, the extent 
to which affective features of schizophrenic unworlding are 
directly modulated by the individual’s disturbed relation 
with their own bodily scaffolding as well as that of others. 
But conceiving of schizophrenia as a disturbance of the 
scaffolded self can also make another useful contribution 
to existing discussions. It can highlight a central aspect of 
unworlding experience that has not received much attention 
thus far: the affective significance of the individual’s dis-
turbed relationship with the material environment.
An important takeaway from our earlier consideration of 
material scaffolding is that it plays a central role in bringing 
regulative stability and predictability to our everyday affec-
tive life. Enjoying reliable access to the things and spaces of 
our material culture—being able to actively integrate with 
them in an immediate and spontaneous way—is crucial for 
our ability to skillfully manage our affective experiences 
on both a moment-to-moment as well as a long-term basis. 
This is because these external spaces and structures, when 
arranged in particular configurations, take over much of 
the regulative work for us. In other words, we individual-
ize our affective “niches” (at home, work, etc.) and, via this 
individualization, settle into and become entrenched within 
them—and thus allow ourselves to delegate part of the reg-
ulative process to our local material scaffolding while we 
focus on other things (Colombetti and Krueger 2015).
Everyday life reveals many examples of affective indi-
vidualization and entrenchment. I’ve intentionally manipu-
lated the material space of my office, for example, in order 
to evoke and sustain a calm and welcoming atmosphere the 
moment that I or others enter into it. I’ve chosen specific art-
works to adorn the walls, placed plants strategically around 
the room, perpetually stream calming ambient music, main-
tain a particular level of soft lighting, and even arrange the 
furniture and bookcases to create the regulative space in 
which this kind of affective experience is predictably elicited 
and sustained without my explicit attention or effort. We rou-
tinely individualize our affective niches in other ways, too, 
via manipulative strategies that highlight how self-selected 
items of material culture act directly on aspects of our affec-
tive states, modulating their character and function—includ-
ing the bodily processes (e.g., changes in autonomic nervous 
system activity, behavioral expressions, etc.) states of action 
readiness (dispositions to act in certain ways), evaluations 
or appraisals, and phenomenal experiences that make up the 
complex architecture of our affective states (Scherer 2009).
For example, we may select brightly colored clothing to 
counteract the relentless grey of a grim English winter, or 
a dark-colored “power suit” for a confidence boost before 
an important job interview. There is evidence that color 
affects moods (Valdez and Mehrabian 1994), and that the 
tactile qualities of clothing (e.g., the fuzziness of a famil-
iar sweater) may contribute to the release of chemicals that 
lower stress levels. Relatedly, the sociologist Jean-Claude 
Kaufmann (2011) has chronicled the affectively-salient 
decisions that go into choosing a handbag’s contents. For 
Kaufmann, a handbook isn’t merely a utilitarian receptacle 
for carrying things. It also functions as affective scaffolding. 
It contains a self-styled collection of technologies chosen 
specifically to regulate short and long-term affective expe-
riences: good luck charms and tokens for peace of mind 
(scaffolding one’s ability to appraise and cope with difficult 
situations); snippets of personal notes or letters from loved 
ones that scaffold fond memories and feelings of nostalgia 
and connectedness; and small weapons or tools that scaffold 
feelings of confidence and security, and regulate awareness 
of relevant action possibilities (e.g., in the face of danger).
To return to an earlier theme: when seamlessly inte-
grated with this material-affective scaffolding, our affec-
tive style—including the way we comport ourselves to 
the environment generally—may differ dramatically than 
when we lack access to it. If I forget my handbag at home, 
for example, I may feel more anxious than usual without 
my good luck charms, or exhibit uncharacteristic timid-
ity whilst navigating the city at night knowing that I lack 
8 Blankenburg (2001) describes this phenomenon as a “loss of com-
mon sense” and argues that it’s at the core of schizophrenic autism.
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ready access to the mace spray normally nestled in the 
bottom of that handbag. Similarly, when I am in my office 
and intensely focused on my writing, the music stream-
ing in the background reliably scaffolds my attention and 
affect. If it suddenly stops, however—if there is network 
trouble that interferes with my internet connection—I will 
be jolted out of this writing-directed entrenchment and 
forced to recalibrate my affective experience and self-reg-
ulative strategies through explicit attention and effort. In 
other words, without the ongoing regulative input of this 
integrated network of material scaffolding, my affective 
style will be dramatically altered; I will need to reorient 
myself to an affective space suddenly deprived of the back-
ground resources I normally trust will be there, working as 
expected (even when I’m not explicitly focused on them).
These examples highlight how individualization (i.e., 
crafting our material niches to modulate our particular 
affective needs) and entrenchment (i.e., settling into and 
skillfully coping with these self-styled niches) together 
generate what we might refer to as an implicit affective 
trust in our environment. When skillfully inhabiting my 
affective niche, I implicitly trust that it will reliably set 
up, drive, and regulate my affective experiences in the 
ways I intend it to (hence my surprise and momentary 
disorientation when something goes wrong). However, 
this affective trust in relation to the material environment 
is precisely what’s missing in unworlding experience. 
This is because the scaffolding used to individualize and 
become entrenched within our environments is no longer 
experienced as affording these regulative practices—much 
the way social scaffolding is not experienced as affording 
engagement—and a crucial mechanism (or set of mecha-
nisms) for affect regulation unavailable.
As noted previously, schizophrenic patients often exhibit 
difficulties with perceptual organization. With respect to the 
material environment, they say things like “Everything is in 
bits. You put the picture up bit by bit in your head. It’s like 
a photograph that’s torn in bits and put together again...If I 
move there’s a new picture that I have to put together again” 
(McGhie and Chapman 1961, p. 106). Elyn Saks describes 
a similar perceptual fragmentation when she says that, “No 
core holds things together...sights, sounds, thoughts, and 
feelings don’t go together. No organizing principle takes 
successive movements in time and puts them together in a 
coherent way from which sense can be made” (Saks 2007, 
p. 13).
A consequence of this perceptual disorganization is that 
schizophrenic individuals lose their practical grip on the 
things around them. The world is no longer experienced as 
presenting an interrelated network of things with determi-
nate meanings and interactive possibilities. Instead, things 
are saturated with a pervasive sense of strangeness and 
unfamiliarity—and interactive possibilities diminished or 
even lost altogether. This loss of material affordances can 
be seen in the following quotes:
“When, for example, I looked at a chair or a jug, I 
thought not of their use or function—a jug not as 
something to hold water and milk, a chair not as 
something to sit in—but as having lost their names, 
their functions, their meanings…” (Sechehaye 1970, 
pp. 55–56).
“Everything around me is immobile. Things appear 
isolated, each one in itself, without suggesting any-
thing. Certain things which ought to evoke memory, 
evoke an immense number of thoughts...remain iso-
lated. They are more understood than experienced” 
(Minkowski 1970, p. 276).
From the perspective of IDM, this loss of practical 
access to the world can, once again, be traced back to a 
disruption of the core self as an orienting zero point of 
consciousness. When this core self is disturbed, the sub-
ject loses “the lived point of orientation and the correlated 
pattern of meanings that make for a coherent and signifi-
cant world”; in the absence of such a stable first-person 
perspective, “the structured nature of the worlds of both 
thought and perception will be altered or even dissolved” 
(Sass and Parnas 2003, p. 436).
This seems right, as far as it goes. But it’s also arguably 
an incomplete description of the phenomenon. For what is 
lost here is not simply reliable access to the world’s practi-
cal significance but, crucially, its affective and regulative 
significance, too. Within unworlding experience, things 
and spaces no longer afford self-regulative possibilities, or 
manifest perceptually as reliable scaffolding one can trust 
to elicit and regulate predictable affective responses—and 
one’s entire affective orientation to the environment (i.e., 
one’s affective style) is modulated accordingly. Put other-
wise, without reliable access to the material environment, 
possibilities for individualization and entrenchment are 
lost, leading to a breakdown of affective trust and a disor-
ganization of an individual’s affective style.
The distinctive character of this affective disturbance 
can be understood by looking at case vignettes like the 
following:
“A 32-year old patient reports that at the age of 
16, he had become more and more uncertain about 
whether his personal things really belonged to him or 
had somehow been exchanged by others. When buy-
ing books, he was not sure if the salesman had not 
secretly replaced the ones he had chosen; so he had 
to give them away and always buy new ones. When 
leaving things on his school-desk inattentively, he 
later began to doubt whether they were still the same, 
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and had to throw them away. More and more he lost 
the trust in his environment” (Fuchs 2005, p. 101).
Part of this patient’s distrust has to do with ownership 
of his belongings (i.e., the delusional fear that someone is 
replacing his belongings with duplicates). But again, there is 
also critical—and potentially overlooked—affective dimen-
sion to this distrust, directly tied to the stability (or lack 
therefore) of the patient’s available material scaffolding. 
Plagued by the fear that the items in his environment are 
continually being replaced, the patient no longer can indi-
vidualize and become comfortably entrenched within a self-
styled network of affective scaffolding. Instead of inhabiting 
spaces set up to reliably elicit and regulate predictable affec-
tive experiences, he must instead devote excessive attention 
to hyper-reflectively scrutinizing his surroundings, hunting 
for indications that someone is deliberately manipulating his 
affective niche. This hyper-reflective stance hinders possi-
bilities for skillful entrenchment. Accordingly, the world and 
things in it no longer afford smooth self-regulative possibili-
ties or function as trustworthy “affective stabilizers”. The 
surrounding space becomes unpredictable and foreboding, 
leading to a disorganized and unstable affective style—and 
an overall diminishment of regulative function and a pro-
found sense of “diminished agency” (Ratcliffe 2013).
Other patient reports similarly speak to this character of 
unworlding experience:
“Then I felt that the autumn landscape [was pervaded] 
with a Second space. It was fine and invisible, hardly 
detectable. The second Space was dark, empty, fright-
ening” (Sass et al. 2017, p. 20).
“Everything was the same and yet it seemed strange” 
(ibid. p. 42).
“...more and more, despite my efforts, I lost the feeling 
of practical things” (Sechehaye 1970, p. 29).
The takeaway lesson from these reports, then, is that 
unworlding is tied not just to a disturbance of minimal self-
hood but also to loss of affective trust in the world—and 
more specifically, trust in the reliable presence of individual-
ized networks of affective scaffolding that normally organize 
the lived spaces of our material environments. This scaffold-
ing brings both regulative stability and predictability to our 
affective life, easily-overlooked features of everyday experi-
ence that make entrenchment and affective trust possible in 
the first place. Without reliable access to this scaffolding, 
however, our ability to manage our affective experiences 
on both a moment-to-moment as well as a long-term basis 
is compromised—leading to a functional disturbance of the 
materially-scaffolded self.
6  Conclusion
I have argued that the notion of “affective scaffolding” can 
be of use to phenomenological psychopathology. After dis-
tinguishing three forms of affective scaffolding—embod-
ied, social, and material—I suggested that these forms of 
affective scaffolding can be fruitfully mapped onto self-
disturbances in schizophrenia. More precisely, I argued that 
“unworlding” experiences in schizophrenia can be under-
stood not simply as a disturbance of ipseity or minimal self-
consciousness but, additionally, of the scaffolded self—the 
affective self established and regulated via its ongoing 
engagement with people and things. This perspective, I’ve 
further suggested, can shed light on the causes and conse-
quences of characteristic challenges schizophrenic patients 
face when it comes to managing their day-to-day affective 
life (i.e., their affective style). To be clear, the preceding 
analysis is not offered to replace IDM. Instead, my inten-
tion is to enrich this approach by bringing to the foreground 
affective dimensions of unworlding sometimes downplayed 
or overlooked by a narrow focus on disturbances of indi-
vidual self-consciousness.
Where does this leave us? Reconceptualizing self-
disturbances in schizophrenia as experiential disruptions 
of the scaffolded self can, I propose, lead to at least two 
substantive consequences. First, this approach can help to 
further illuminate the causal complexity of schizophrenic 
self-disorder—and in particular, the extent to which both 
extra-neural embodied as well as environmental scaffold-
ing comprise some of the regulatory dynamics responsible 
for the characteristic affective dysfunction. For some pro-
ponents of biological psychiatry, psychiatric disorders are 
a matter of one or more functional neurological failures.9 
As a consequence of this assumption, the “fMRI dream of 
psychiatric imaging”, as Sprevak (2011) refers to it, is that 
taxonomizing, diagnosing, and treating psychiatric disor-
ders—including self-disturbances in schizophrenia—can be 
done by taxonomizing, diagnosing, and treating underlying 
neurological failures. However, if SA and the notion of the 
scaffolded self are on the right track, they suggest that the 
causal mechanisms responsible for affective disturbances in 
schizophrenia may involve more than a single localizable 
failure in a particular brain region—or even, perhaps, a sin-
gle disturbance of a minimal structural feature of conscious-
ness (i.e., ipseity). Instead, insofar as the affective self is 
9 Recent examples of this assumption can be found in characteriza-
tions of depression (Castrén 2005; Drevets et al. 2008; Pandya et al. 
2012) and anxiety (Wehrenberg and Prinz 2007) as brain disorders. 
Similarly, Insel and Quirion (2005) begin their general defense of 
psychiatry as a clinical neuroscience discipline by insisting that 
“mental disorders be understood and treated as brain disorders” 
(p. 2221).
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regulated and maintained via resources distributed through-
out the extra-neural body and perhaps even the surround-
ing environment, it is possible that the relevant breakdown 
involves multiple disturbances both inside as well as outside 
the individual, within their ongoing engagement with the 
people and things around them. An alternative explanatory 
framework is thus needed to capture the complex interplay 
of distributed components and processes responsible for this 
breakdown. SA can offer theoretical resources for develop-
ing such a framework.
Second—and following from the first point—this view 
may have practical consequences for how we approach inter-
vention and treatment. If there is doubt that schizophrenic 
disturbances have clear-cut underlying neural causes—but 
instead arise from a more general disturbance of the larger 
brain-body-environment system—pharmacological strate-
gies targeting specific brain regions will likely be inade-
quate on their own. Instead, it will be important to develop 
robustly embodied and situated strategies designed to recali-
brate the individual’s entire way of being in the world and 
relating to themselves and others—strategies targeting their 
affective style.
As the previous analysis suggested, affective disturbances 
in schizophrenia—and perhaps many mental disorders more 
generally—are existential, not exclusively neural, insofar 
as they are subjectively experiential, situated, and agential 
(Matthews 2007). What is therefore needed are “bottom-
up treatment methods” that shift bodily dynamics and feel-
ings, and which allow not only for changes in cognition and 
patterns of thought but also embodied affect and emotion 
(Maiese 2015). Therapeutic methods like yoga, music, and 
dance/movement therapies may be examples of such treat-
ment methods. Admittedly, these strategies are relatively 
new and require further study and careful implementation. 
However, as Maiese documents in detail, they have already 
shown promising success in helping people with schizophre-
nia learn how to re-inhabit and become more attuned to their 
bodies, deepen their sense of ownership and agency, feel 
more at home in their surroundings, and develop expressive 
channels for exploring and regulating their emotions and 
sharing these emotions with others (i.e., learning how to 
re-inhabit we-space) (see Maiese 2015, ch. 6).
To conclude, the point, once again, is not that brain-
side mechanisms play no role whatsoever in mental illness. 
Clearly they do. But we are more than our brains. What a 
scaffolded approach reminds us is that who we are is very 
much a matter of where we are. The continually-changing 
network of spaces and places, people and things, that com-
prise our shared world are often part of us—part of the regu-
lative dynamics that make up the scaffolded self.
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